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BIANNUAL SURVEY
practice, propounds a generally liberal position.160 The latter states
that "where special damages are not an integral part of the cause
of action . . . 3015(d)'s requirement of itemization should be
given very little if any significance by the courts." ''1  Pro-
fessor Siegel indicates that the necessity for this section is obviated
by the bill of particulars.
It is this obvious contrariety of opinion that is dealt with
by the supreme court in Friendly Babylon Corp. v. Locust at
Ralph Corp.162 In this case, plaintiff moved to dismiss defendant's
answer on the ground that two defenses-counterclaims were in-
adequately pleaded. Defendant had generally alleged special dam-
ages in pleading defamation and prima facie tort. The court
granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss and indicated that of the two
aforementioned views, that of Professors Weinstein, Korn and
Miller was the proper one.
Unfortunately, trial counsel had inadvertently failed to call the
court's attention to Professor Siegel's full commentary. Although
Professor Siegel advocates general disregard of 3015(d) he does
cite an exception:
[D]ifferent conclusions may be warranted in those few cases in which special
damages are an element of the cause of action itself, e.g., libel other
than libel per se . . .prima facie tort . 163
Thus, by virtue of this exception, it appears that Professor Siegel
would be in agreement with the result reached by the court.
Dismissal of complaint-importance of having court specify whether
dismissal is pursuant to CPLR 3012 or 3216.
CPLR 3012 provides for the dismissal of an action when
plaintiff fails to serve a complaint within twenty days after a
demand by the defendant. Dismissals pursuant to this section,
or its predecessor, CPA § 257, have occurred where no valid
excuse for the delay is indicated and no meritorious claim is
shown.
In addition, CPLR 3216 provides for dismissal when a party
unreasonably neglects to proceed in the prosecution of his cause.
Clearly, the distinction between the two may become clouded
when there is a dismissal following an untimely service of a
complaint, if the court is not explicit about the ground for its
decision. This distinction is significant when the motion to
dismiss is granted after the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's
claim has run. If the action is then dismissed, plaintiff would
1607B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3015, supp. commentary 57 (1964).
l 61Id. at 59.
16244 Misc..2d 563, 254 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
163 Supra note 160, at 59.
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seemingly lose his cause altogether. This potential inequity is
vitiated in part by CPLR 205, which provides, that if the dismissal
is for other than a want of prosecution, a six-month extension
of the statute of limitations is given to the plaintiff. No such
extension is given after a 3216 dismissal for failure to prosecute.
The problem is one, then, of recognition-when does the
delay in serving a complaint become so inordinate as to justify a
dismissal on the basis of "neglect to proceed" rather than failure
to serve a complaint?
This problem is discernible in two recent appellate division
cases. In Houle v. Wilde'" the plaintiff had failed to serve a
complaint for fifteen months after negotiations had terminated.
Plaintiff was allowed, by the lower court, to open his default.
The appellate division reversed on the basis that both the affidavit
of merit and excuse for delay were deficient.
Similarly, in Flannery v. Stewart,16 5 the court considered a
motion to vacate a dismissal based on a delay of eight months
in the service of the complaint. The motion to vacate came
almost four months after the dismissal. The court held that there
was neither a valid excuse shown for the delay nor an affidavit
of merit and, as a result, denied the motion to vacate. In this
case the court cited its own opinion in Keogh v. New York Post
Corp.1 66 which had ended with a dismissal pursuant to 3216 for
neglect to prosecute. As a result, there must be some doubt
as to the effect of the dismissal in Flannery on the 205 extension,
and, by analogy, in Houle.
1 67
A New York case which reflects the possibility of an inordinate
delay in service of a complaint resulting in a neglect to proceed
dismissal is Loomis v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,16  where
the plaintiff's original action was dismissed when he failed to
serve a complaint within three years after defendant had appeared.
The third department affirmed a lower court ruling refusing to
allow plaintiff to reinstitute his action on the basis that the original
dismissal was one
for failure of service [of the complaint] . . . as well as neglect to prosecute
the action. Consequently the statute of jeofailes 169 does not now help
the appellants . . . to the right to commence a new action . . . after the
expiration of the time limited therefor. 170
16422 App. Div. 2d 727, 253 N.Y.S.2d 234 (3d Dep't 1964).
165 22 App. Div. 2d 786, 254 N.Y.S.2d 130 (lst Dep't 1964).
166 22 App. Div. 2d 659, 253 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1st Dep't 1964).
167 Analogy may be drawn to the Houle case since the court in that case
cited neither section 3012 nor rule 3216, and since the facts in both Houle
and Flannery show similar long delays.
168 256 App. Div. 443, 10 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dep't 1939).
169 This refers to CPA § 23, which was the predecessor of CPLR
205.
170 Loomis v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 443, 443-44,
10 N.Y.S.2d 283, 284 (3d Dep't 1939).
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This case highlights the problem of whether a practitioner can
determine the statutory cause of his dismissal if the court is not
explicit. Neither Houle nor Flannery comes to grips with this
problem. Both illustrate the need for some judicial determination
so that the practitioner can judge how long a delay will change
a 3012 dismissal into a 3216 dismissal, and thereby cause a
plaintiff to lose the six-month extension granted by CPLR 205.171
CPLR 3019(c): Setoff counterclaim on assigned claim.
Until 1936 the Civil Practice Act divided counterclaims into
two categories: the setoff and the recoupment.1 2  The setoff could
be asserted by an obligor against a plaintiff if the claim matured
before assignment, and if defendant had knowledge of the claim
prior to notice of the assignment. On the other hand, a recoupment
counterclaim could be asserted although maturing after assignment. 7 3
After 1936 there was some doubt as to whether an amendment
to the section eliminated this division. CPLR 3019(c) retained
this confusion. All doubt was ended in 1964 by the court of
appeals which, in the case of James Talcott, Inc. v. Winco Sales
Corp., 27 4 confirmed the recoupment-setoff distinction.
In the recent appellate division case of Chatham Sec. Corp.
v. J.R. Williston & Beane,175 defendant asserted a claim against
the plaintiff arising out of a separate transaction with plaintiff's
principal-assignor. That case was resolved on principles of agency.
The court held that "it is well-established law that an agent who
acquires an interest in his principal's contract takes subject to
defenses available against this principal even as any assignee .... . 176
With the case so resolved, the court chose to discuss plaintiff's
contention that it was an assignee. 7 7 The court indicated that the
counterclaim was a setoff since it arose from a transaction other
than the one sued upon by the plaintiff.
Since the court acknowledged that the counterclaim was a set-
off, the dictates of Talcott demanded that it could only be raised
against the plaintiff if it existed prior to the assignnent, and if
172 For an excellent illustration of the lack of clarity that marks this
area see Simmons v. New York City Transit Authority (Sup. Ct. Kings
County) 153 N.Y.L.J., March 5, 1965, p. 18, col. 2.
.72 CPA § 266 as amended.
'173CPA § 267 as amended.
174 14 N.Y.2d 227, 199 N.E.2d 499, 250 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1964). This case
is analyzed in The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST. JOHN's
L. REv. 181, 182-83 (1964).
175 22 App. Div. 2d 260, 254 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1st Dep't 1964).
76 Id. at 265, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
177After indicating that Chatham was liable for the setoff, the court
introduced its conclusion as to plaintiff's rights as an assignee: "If
Chatham is treated as an assignee of Arlee, its position is worsened."
Ibid.
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